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Education, Fair Competition, and Concern for the Worst Off
Abstract: In this essay, Johannes Giesinger comments on the current philosophical debate on educa-
tional justice. He observes that while authors like Elizabeth Anderson and Debra Satz develop a so-
called adequacy view of educational justice, Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift defend an egalitarian  
principle. Giesinger focuses his analysis on the main objection that is formulated, from an egalitarian  
perspective, against the adequacy view: that it neglects the problem of securing fair opportunities in  
the competition for social rewards. Giesinger meets this objection by expressing two basic theses:  
First, he argues that Brighouse and Swift themselves fail to give an adequate account of fair competi -
tion; and, second, he shows that the adequacy view provides the theoretical resources to face this pro -
blem.
In the current philosophical debate on educational justice, there are two main answers to 
the  question  of  how education  should  be  distributed among  individuals:  According  to 
educational  egalitarians  such  as  Harry  Brighouse  and  Adam  Swift1,  only  an  equitable 
distribution of education can be seen as just. Adherents of the so-called adequacy view call 
this into question: Two such authors, Elizabeth Anderson and Debra Satz2m  hold the view 
that justice does not demand equality in education, but an education that is adequate (or 
sufficient) with regard to a certain political or moral ideal.
1 This essay refers mainly to following recent articles by these authors: Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, 
“Putting  Educational  Equality  in  its  Place,”  Education  Finance  and  Policy 3,  no.  4  (2008):  444-66; 
“Educational  Equality  versus  Educational  Adequacy:  A Response  to  Anderson and Satz,”  Journal  of  
Applied Philosophy  26,  no.  2  (2009),  117-128. See also Harry Brighouse,  School  Choice  and Social  Justice 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), and Adam Swift, How Not to Be a Hyprocrite, School Choice for the  
Morally Perplexed Parent (London: Routedge Falmer, 2003).
2 Elizabeth Anderson has presented her view in two papers so far: “Rethinking Educational Opportunity: 
Comment on Adam Swift’s How Not to be a Hypocrite,” Theory and Research in Education 2, no. 2 (2004): 
99-110; and “Fair Opportunity in Education: A Democratic Equality Perspective,” Ethics 117, no. 4 (2007): 
595-622. An earlier version of her position is already outlined in: “What is the Point of Equality?” Ethics 
109, no. 1 (1999): 287-337. Debra Satz formulates a similar view in “Equality, Adequacy, and Education 
for  Citizenship,”  Ethics 117,  no.  4  (2007):  623-48;  and “Equality,  Adequacy,  and Educational  Policy,” 
Education  Finance  and  Policy 3,  no.  4  (2008):  424-43.  While  Anderson  prefers  to  use  the  term 
“sufficientarian“  to  characterize  her  position,  Satz  puts  the  concept  of  adequacy—taken  from 
contemporary debates  on school  reform in  the  United States—at  the  core of  her  deliberations.  Both 
Anderson and Satz use the idea of a threshold level of education to spell out their positions. This idea—
in the  democratic  version  defended  by  Anderson  and  Satz—can  be  traced  back  to  Amy  Gutmann,  
Democratic Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1987). 
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Anderson and Satz use the idea of democratic (or civic) equality to define this goal; each 
citizen, they claim, should receive an education adequate for him to function as an equal  
within the democratic community. Thus, these authors start by outlining a political ideal 
and proceed to ask how education should [42] be distributed to foster the realization of this 
ideal. While egalitarians answer the distributive question without saying anything about 
the  aims  of  education,  the  adequacy  view offers  answers  to  both  questions:  how much 
education and what kind of education should be provided for each child? 
Obviously,  an  equitable  distribution  of  education  does  not  ensure  that  each  person 
receives  an  adequate  education.  Neither  does  it  guarantee  that  schools  foster  the 
development of desirable abilities, nor does it make sure that these abilities are developed up 
to an “adequate“ level. Educational equality can always be reached by “leveling down“,that 
is,  by  worsening  the  position  of  the  better  off.  This  insight  leads  some  educational 
egalitarians to accept the idea of (democratic) adequacy as a complementary consideration.3 
The adequacy view does not simply specify the obligations of the state in the field of 
education, it is also used to justify educational inequalities.  Once all citizens are ensured an 
adequate  education,  inequalities  of  educational  resources,  the  quality  of  education 
provided, and educational outcomes are seen as legitimate. In their critique of the adequacy 
view,  educational  egalitarians  point  to  the  fact  that  the  value  of  education  is,  in  part,  
positional; its absolute value for one person depends on how well educated she is relative 
to other persons.4 Only if the person is better qualified than others will he or she have a real  
chance  of  succeeding  in  the  competition  for  social  rewards.  Thus,  any  educational 
inequality is  likely to disadvantage the worse  off  in the  “race” for  advantage.  In  other 
words:  Any  educational  inequality  threatens  the  realization  of  the  political  ideal  of 
“equality of opportunity“. If we are determined to foster this ideal, it seems, we will have to 
stipulate an equitable distribution of education.
Thus, the main egalitarian objection against the adequacy view is that it does not provide 
an adequate answer to the problem of fair competition. Indeed, the democratic adequacy 
account  is  not  focused  on  this  problem,  but  on  the  problem  of  social  and  political 
integration.  Nevertheless,  I  argue  in  this  essay,  it  offers  the  core  idea  of  a  promising 
approach to the problem of fair competition, an approach that is based on notions of self-
3 See See Kenneth Strike, “Equality of Opportunity and School Finance: A Commentary on Ladd, Satz, and 
Brighouse and Swift,” Education Finance and Policy 3, no. 4 (2008): 467-494; see also Brighouse and Swift, 
“Educational Equality versus Educational Adequacy“.
4 See Harry Brighouse and Adam Swift, “Equality, Priority, and Positional Goods,“ Ethics 116, no. 3 (2006) 
471-97; William Koski and Rob Reich, “When ‘Adequate’ isn‘t: The Retreat from Equity in Educational  
Law and Policy and Why it Matters,” Emory Law Review 56, no. 3 (2006): 545-616; William Koski and Rob 
Reich, “The State’s Obligation to Provide Education: Adequate Education or Equal Education,” (Paper 
presented at the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, April 2008)..
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respect and dignity. The democratic adequacy account starts from the intuitive idea failing 
to  give  persons  the  opportunity  [43] to  qualify  for  positions  of  advantage injures  their 
dignity.  On this  basis,  at  least  some educational  inequalities  must  be  considered to  be 
illegitimate. Anderson and Satz hold the view that their account leaves room for significant 
educational inequalities, but this estimation might be called into question.
It  must be  emphasized,  though,  that  the  so-called egalitarian theories  of  educational 
justice  do  not  rule  out  any kind  of  educational  inequality;  Brighouse  and  Swift’s 
“meritocratic“ principle of educational equality is a good example. Hence, these authors are 
in need of a justification for those inequalities they see as legitimate. I comment on their  
conception of educational justice, which introduces two more principles (both considered as 
prior to educational equality), in the first part of this essay, while in the second part, I turn 
toward the adequacy view and its connection with the idea of fair competition. In the third 
part,  I  take  a closer look at the dignity view of fair competition that is  inherent to the 
democratic adequacy account.
Meritocratic Equality and Fair Competition
Brighouse and Swift’s understanding of educational equality refers to the classical idea that 
educational inequalities should not be due to social background: “An individual’s prospects 
for educational achievement may be a function of that individual’s talent and effort, but it  
should not be influenced by her  social  class  background.“5 Brighouse  and Swift  do not 
overlook  the  fact  that  this  conception—they  call  it  meritocratic—has  some  serious 
shortcomings.
First, it could be said—from an egalitarian perspective—that this account is too weak, 
since it stipulates the neutralization of only one source of educational inequality. Within 
this  conception,  inequalities  of  natural  endowment  are  seen  as  legitimate  obstacles  to 
educational achievement.6 Additional educational resources are thus ensured for socially 
disadvantaged children but not for children with innate learning disabilities. Furthermore, 
this account does not demand the neutralization of  all the social obstacles to educational 
success; differences of personal effort, rooted in unequal motivation and ambition, do not 
have to be eliminated, although they might be caused by inequalities of family background.
5 Brighouse and Swift, “Putting Educational Equality in its Place,” 447.
6  Brighouse and Swift use the concept of talent in the sense of natural endowment or potential. As is well-
known, other understandings of the term are possible: Talent might be thought of as brought about by 
social circumstances. But even if we adhere to a social understanding of talent, we will not deny that its  
development is based on genetic preconditions that may differ from individual to individual. Thus, even 
if  Brighouse and Swift’s use of the term talent is rejected, it makes sense to speak of  inequalities of natural  
endowment (or potential). 
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Second, the meritocratic conception seems too strong, since its full realization would be 
incompatible with parental autonomy. It is well known that the development of ability is 
strongly influenced by the social and cultural practices of the family. According to a widely 
accepted view, however, parents should have the liberty to arrange the everyday lives of 
their family according to their [44] own values. If we wanted to eliminate the social sources 
of educational inequality, we would have to give up this principle; it would be necessary to 
intervene into the intimate life of the family or to abolish this social institution altogether.
Finally,  the  meritocratic  conception  of  educational  equality,  as  it  is  interpreted  by 
Brighouse and Swift, is incomplete since it does not say anything about the distribution of 
resources (or achievement) among children with different natural potentials. So, it would be 
fully consistent with this approach to give more attention or resources to the less-talented 
than  to  the  talented  but  supporting  gifted  children  with  additional  resources  is  also 
consistent with this approach. 
Consider these three problems in turn. The first of them arises because organizing social 
competition according to the meritocratic ideal inevitably creates inequalities of status and 
wealth—inequalities  that  call  for  justification.  One  would  expect  defenders  of  the 
meritocratic  view to  think  that  this  view  provides  a  justification  for  these  inequalities. 
Brighouse  and Swift,  however,  do not  seem to  be  sure about  that:  why should natural 
inequalities and differences of motivation and effort be seen as legitimate obstacles in the 
competition for advantage? In this context, two different understandings of the notion of 
desert  (or merit) could  be  brought  into  play.  First,  we  could  say  that  we  merit  certain 
rewards because of  our natural  endowment.  It  is  unclear,  however,  why our potentials 
should give rise to rewards. What matters in the distribution of social rewards is not inborn 
potential but developed ability and the motivation to use it. The distribution of education 
among  individuals  determines  the  development  of  their  abilities.  If  what  people  merit 
depends on their education, a merit-based argument cannot be used to justify a certain 
distribution of education.7 
A second line of thought uses an understanding of desert that is linked to the concept of  
responsibility: we do not deserve our social disadvantages, since we are not responsible for 
our family background circumstances.8 This, however, seems to lead too far because, in the 
same sense, we do not deserve our natural potentials. Brighouse and Swift are not ready, at 
least in their work to date, to defend a “radical” conception of educational equality which 
would  amount  to  the  neutralization  of  all  inequalities  that  cannot  be  traced  back  to 
responsible acting. At the same time, however, they do not put pressure on the first of the 
7 See Anderson,  “Rethinking Educational Opportunity,” 103; Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education 
for Citizenship,” 630.
8 See Brighouse, School Choice and Social Justice, 117-18.
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justifications for meritocracy proposed earlier. What then gives them confidence that the 
meritocratic view provides an adequate account of fair competition?
The additional principles proposed by Brighouse and Swift are not designed to solve this 
problem but to address the two other shortcomings mentioned. The first of these principles 
concerns the problem of family autonomy—it is  meant to ensure that parents and their 
children have the opportunity to develop a flourishing family life and to enjoy intimate 
relationships.  This  is,  according to Brighouse  and Swift,  a  basic  interest  of  parents  and 
children that gives rise to a corresponding  [45] right and a duty to respect this right. To 
respect this right means, for instance, that we allow parents to read bedtime stories to their 
children,  even though  this  is  likely  to  increase  inequalities  of  educational  achievement 
(provided that not all parents do it). On the other hand, advantaging one’s own children by 
spending one’s money on their education is not justified by Brighouse and Swift’s principle 
of  parental  liberty.  Prohibiting  private  educational  investments  does  not,  as  they  note, 
endanger the intimacy of family life.
Brighouse and Swift think, of course, that educational disadvantage arising from family 
background should be mitigated within the school system. It is not clear, however,  how 
much additional  resources  have  to  be  provided  for  the  socially  disadvantaged—the 
education system cannot be expected to eliminate these disadvantages completely. It seems, 
however,  that  Brighouse  and Swift’s  conception of  educational  equality  demands to do 
whatever is possible within the limits of the parental liberty principle that would raise the 
educational level of working-class children. This is indeed “very demanding”9—in fact, it is 
too demanding since it sets no clear limits to the amount of resources that have to be spent 
on the education of the socially disadvantaged.
While it is relatively uncontroversial among advocates of the meritocratic view that the 
integrity of the family is more important than educational equality, not many will accept 
the next step taken by Brighouse and Swift.  They subordinate meritocratic equality to a 
principle that gives priority to the benefit of the worst off. Concern for benefiting the worst  
off  is,  within their  conception of  educational  justice,  “the  most  urgent  consideration  of 
justice.“10 Recall that Rawls, in A Theory of Justice,11 proposes a different order of principles; 
the meritocratic idea—expressed in his principle of fair equality of opportunity—is seen as 
lexically prior to the difference principle—a member of the family of “prioritarian” views.12 
9 Brighouse and Swift, “Putting Educational Equality in its Place,” 447.
10 Brighouse and Swift, “Putting Educational Equality in its Place,”451.
11 John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971).
12 These  views  are  sometimes  called  “prioritarian”  because  they  require  that  priority be  given  to  the 
interests of the worst off. It is not my aim, in this paper, to give an account of the details that distinguish  
between different views of this family.
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The principle of benefiting the worst off, Brighouse and Swift explain, can be used to 
remedy one of the shortcomings of the meritocratic principle; it can help to decide how 
educational  resources  should  be  distributed  among  individuals  with  unequal  natural 
potential. If we have to choose between a policy that gives special attention to the gifted 
and  another  that  provides  additional  resources  for  students  with  inborn  learning 
disabilities, we have to ask, according to Brighouse and Swift,  which of these policies is 
more likely to improve the position of the worst off in society. This principle gives rise to 
considerations of efficiency: it is clear that privileging the gifted within the school system 
will not  directly benefit the less talented, but only if the gifted use their [46] education for 
the good of the whole of society. If, for instance, the productivity of the economic system is 
increased by giving special attention to the gifted, the less talented might be expected to 
benefit from this. The legitimacy of educational inequalities depends on the overall effects 
of these inequalities. Thus, if we accept the principle proposed by Brighouse and Swift, our 
views of justice will depend on empirical assumptions concerning these effects. We have to 
ask, for instance, whether inequalities of educational resources caused by private parental 
investments ultimately benefit the worst off. Brighouse and Swift cannot be sure, of course, 
that this will  not be the case:  “Whether it  does so,  depends entirely on the facts in the 
particular  social  context,”  they say.13 In the  same way,  whether supporting the socially 
disadvantaged with additional resources—as it is required by the meritocratic principle—
improves the situation of the worst off can only be determined by examining the facts of  
particular cases.
It is unclear how a theory that subordinates the meritocratic principle to the principle of 
concern for the worst off is distinguished from a conception that gives up the meritocratic 
principle completely.14 Of course, it can be expected that concern for the worst off is,  in 
many cases, compatible with the meritocratic principle; the first of these principles might 
even be used to justify the latter. With regard to efficiency, it seems promising to educate 
people according to their natural potential. On the other hand, it makes sense to consider 
the  following question formulated by  Richard Taylor:  “Might  it  not  be  to  the  ‚greatest 
benefit  of  the  least  advantaged‘  to  focus  educational  subsidies  instead  on  those  (often 
13 Brighouse and Swift, “Putting Educational Equality in its Place,”451.
14 See Richard Arneson’s statement “Against Rawlsian Equality of Opportunity,”  Philosophical Studies 93, 
no.  1  (1999):  77-112.  Arneson proposes  to  give  up the  principle  of  fair  equality  of  opportunity.  The 
distribution of social positions should be guided, according to his view, by the difference principle. He  
accepts however, that  Rawls‘ principle of equal liberty should be seen as lexically prior to the difference 
principle.
6
Education, Fair Competition, and Concern for the Worst Off
socially advantaged) students for whom such investment would offer the highest rate and 
then tax them for the benefit of the poor?“15
It is a thus matter of empirical contingencies whether concern for the worst off implies  
fair competition for positions of advantage. It is not clear, for instance, that discriminatory 
admission practices or large inequalities of educational resources harm the worst off under 
any social circumstances. If we give priority to the interests of the worst off, we must be 
ready to give up the meritocratic principle whenever it turns out to be inefficient.  In trying 
to remedy the shortcomings of the meritocratic principle, which is commonly interpreted as 
a principle of fair competition, Brighouse and Swift give up the idea that fair competition is  
of primary moral importance. Why does this matter, we could ask, if it is to the advantage 
of the worst off? It becomes clear, at this point, that we still lack an adequate justification of 
fair  competition.  Only  if  it  is  possible  to  justify  a  principle  [47] of  fair  competition 
independently of  efficiency  considerations  can  the  priority  of  fair  competition  be  made 
plausible. 
Adequacy and Fair Competition
Anderson and Satz  reject  the  meritocratic  principle  without  giving  up  the  idea  of  fair 
competition. They also ascribe some weight to the ideas expressed in Brighouse and Swift’s 
two additional principles: parental liberty and concern for the worst off. Let us consider the 
significance of these two ideas within the democratic adequacy account.
Anderson and Satz strongly disagree with Brighouse and Swift about the  scope  of the 
parental liberty principle. They think that parents have a right to use their own money to 
promote  their  children’s  education:  “The  Swift/Brighouse  argument,“  Satz  comments, 
“unacceptably constrains those families with conceptions of the good that favor promoting 
the education of their child, but lack the time to do the promoting themselves. Dual-career 
families are likely to be especially constrained by this approach.“16 So, according to Satz, the 
principle of parental liberty should not only protect the intimacy of relationships within the 
family. Its primary purpose is to allow parents to live according to their own conceptions of 
the good. Thus understood, the dissent about the scope of the parental liberty might be 
traced back to different justifications of this principle. Choosing a private school for one’s 
child is, if we follow Satz’s deliberations, just one of many parental decisions that affect the 
child’s life prospects. Why, Satz asks, should parents be prevented from this while being 
allowed to take their children into a forest and tell them everything about trees or birds? 
The main difference between these activities is, according to Brighouse and Swift, that the 
15 Richard Taylor,  „Self-Realization  and  the  Priority  of  Fair  Equality  of  Opportunity,“  Journal  of  Moral  
Philosophy 1, no. 3 (2004), 335. 
16 Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship,” 634.
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latter—in contrast to the former—cannot be prohibited without damaging the intimate life 
of the family.
The crucial question in this context is whether the principle of parental autonomy, as 
outlined by Satz and Anderson, trumps their principle of adequacy; that is, should parents 
be free to pay for their child’s education, even if this makes it impossible to provide an 
adequate education for every child? The advocates of the adequacy view might reply that 
these two principles will never conflict,  since it is the state’s responsibility to ensure an 
adequate education for all. If this is the case, unequal parental investments will not impinge 
upon justice. 
This  is,  I  suppose,  the reply provided by Anderson who defends,  as  do many other 
adherents of the adequacy view, a threshold conception of educational justice. In her well-
known essay  What  is  the  Point  of  Equality?,  she  makes  use  of  Amartya  Sen’s  capability 
approach to define a basic level of education that she considers sufficient for functioning as 
a full-fledged member of the democratic community.  In her recent essay on educational 
justice,  Fair Opportunity in Education, she keeps the idea of a basic threshold but specifies it 
in a different way. Here, she starts from the question of how the elites in a democratic  
society should be constituted. [48] Her answer is, roughly put, that democratic elites should 
be willing and able to serve the community in general and especially its disadvantaged 
members. The second question is how future bearers of elite positions should be educated 
to become responsive to the interests and problems of disadvantaged groups. It is most 
important, according to Anderson, that future decision makers have the opportunity for 
personal  interaction  with  children  from  all  sectors  of  society.  Only  through  constant 
personal contact, she claims, can mutual understanding evolve. Therefore, children from all 
walks of life should be educated together. Social integration within schools does not only 
enable bearers of elite position to gain the knowledge necessary for good decision making, 
it  also  makes  it  more  likely  that  members  of  disadvantaged  groups  can  join  the  elite 
themselves. Anderson argues for a substantial representation of disadvantaged groups in 
positions  of  the  elite;  the  socially  disadvantaged,  she  assumes,  are  especially  fit  to 
understand  the  needs  of  the  disadvantaged  because  they  know  them  from  their  own 
experience. So, working-class children should have effective access to elite positions and to 
the education necessary to compete for these positions. This can be ensured, Anderson says,  
by providing an adequate K-12 education to all the students: 
“[E]very student with the underlying potential should be prepared by their primary and 
middle schools to be able to successfully complete a college preparatory high school 
curriculum  and  should  have  a  curriculum  available  to  them  in  high  school  upon 
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successfully  completing  the  requisite  prior  course  work.  This  yields  a  high  but  not 
unattainable sufficientarian standard for fair educational opportunity.”17 
This formulation of an educational threshold level does not refer to a set of basic capabilities 
but to a certain level of achievement within an existing school system.
Recall that this threshold conception is designed, in the first place, to ensure that the elite 
of a democratic society will be responsive to the needs of all. In other words, educational  
and  social  inequalities  shall  be  constituted  in  a  way  that  amounts  to  the  benefit  of 
everyone , and particularly the worst off in society. Anderson, however, is aware that this is 
only  one  of  the  aspects  that  have  to  be  taken into  account,  in  this  context. 18 Within  a 
conception of democratic equality, it is crucial to ask whether a certain education policy is  
compatible with the aim of treating all the citizens as equals. When some social groups are 
excluded from competing for positions of advantage or economical wealth, they are in fact 
relegated  to  second-class  citizenship,  even  if  they  meet  some  sufficiency  standard. 
Excluding some people from competition is wrong, according to the democratic adequacy 
view,  [49] not only because of its (possibly) negative  public effects, but also because those 
excluded are violated in their status as equals (or their dignity).
Anderson  claims  that  the  adequacy  standard  stated  above  avoids  this  danger—it 
guarantees  fair  conditions  of  competing  for  advantage  even  if  wealthy  parents  spend 
additional money for their children’s education. It can be objected, however, that to fix a 
certain  level  of  education  as  sufficient  is  likely  to  provide  new  incentives  for  wealthy 
parents  to  maintain  or  increase  the  positional  advantage  of  their  children  by  private 
educational investments.19 
Consider also the following objection raised by Brighouse and Swift: 
“[S]uppose,” they say, “the education budget receives a bounty and the authorities have 
a choice as to how to spend it. They could divide it equally among all children, devote it 
to the 10% of the children who receive most educational input from their families, or 
17 Anderson, “Fair Opportunity in Education,” 613.
18  See Anderson, “Fair Opportunity in Education,” 617-18. William Koski and Rob Reich, however, say that 
Anderson and Satz “understand the purpose of the state’s involvement in educational distribution to be 
strictly  public  or  civic,  related  to  the  preparation  of  able  citizens  and  to  sustain  the  flourishing  of 
democratic life” (“The State’s Obligation to Provide Education”, 20). In other words, Anderson and Satz 
consider education as a public good only and neglect its role as a private good in the competition for social 
rewards.  Koski and Reich do not consider the possibility that the ideal of egalitarian relationships might 
be apt to ground a conception of fair competition. It must be admitted, that some passages in Anderson’s 
writings support their view (see Anderson, “Rethinking Equality of Opportunity,” 106-107).
19 Koski and Reich, “The State’s Obligation to Provide Education,” 33.
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devote it to the education of the 10% of children who receive least educational input 
from their families.”20 
As the authors explain, the meritocratic view would give us reason to prefer the last course 
of  action.21 A threshold conception of  educational  justice,  they say,  is  indifferent  to the 
distributive  question  when  the  level  defined  as  sufficient  is  already  achieved.  Such  a 
conception is  insensitive to the fact that additional  resources poured into the education 
system—by parents  or the state—are likely to change the conditions of  competition for 
social rewards. Anderson’s adequacy account is, I think, vulnerable to this objection. 
In  contrast  to  Anderson,  Satz  does  not  define  precisely  which  level  of  educational 
achievement has to be seen as adequate. When she speaks of “citizenship’s high threshold,” 
she is simply referring to the threshold set by the idea of civic equality.22 This basic idea 
does not only require that an educational minimum be provided for everyone, it is also 
used to justify the idea of fair competition: “Care must be taken”, says Satz, “to ensure that 
those with fewer opportunities  are not  at  such relative  disadvantage as  to offend their 
dignity  or  self-  respect”23.  Members  of  disadvantaged  groups  should  have  “fair 
opportunities for educational  and employment positions above the minimum. No social 
group  should  be  relegated  to  a  second-class  position,  with  access  only  to  inferior  and 
unrewarding schools and jobs.”24 
This dignity-based account of fair competition leaves room for a dynamic understanding 
of  the adequacy standard—an understanding that  is  sensitive  to  the specific  conditions 
within particular education systems and the changes [50] of these conditions. If we follow 
this  path,  however,  we have to  take into  account  that  the principle  of  adequacy might 
conflict with the parental liberty principle, as it is spelled out by Anderson and Satz. This 
conflict has to be resolved, within the theoretical framework outlined by these authors, by 
referring to the idea of civic or democratic equality. Based on my reading of their work,  
neither Anderson nor Satz would deny that, in light of this idea, providing an adequate 
education for all is more important than safeguarding the liberty of some parents to spend 
private money for their children’s education. 
Both,  however,  are convinced that  there is  room for private  educational  investments 
above the adequacy level. Moreover, both expect these parental spendings to improve the 
20 Brighouse and Swift, “Putting Educational Equality in its Place,” 463.
21 What they conceal is that the principle of concern for the worst off might lead to a different distribution.
22 Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship,” 648.
23 Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship,” 637-38.
24 Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship,” 647.
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overall  prospects  of the worst off.25 To make this belief appear plausible,  Anderson 
refers to her view that future members of the elite should be prepared to work for 
the good of everyone: “[O]nce educational institutions are designed so that more 
highly educated elites are genuinely responsive to everyone’s interests,  everyone 
benefits  from others’  education,  and we all  share an interest  in having some be 
educated more highly than the median voter would be willing to fund.”26 Thus, if 
the  education  system is  designed  to  benefit  the  worst  off  in  society,  additional 
resources  are  likely  to  reinforce this  effect.  Remember,  however,  that  this  public 
effect can only be expected to occur, according to Anderson, if the elite is socially 
integrated.  Thus,  if  private  investments  amount  to  an  exclusion  of  the  socially 
disadvantaged from access  to  elite  positions,  those excluded are harmed in two 
different  ways:  first,  unfair  conditions  of  competition  violate  their  dignity,  and 
second, the fact that no members of disadvantaged groups join the elite might have 
negative public effects.
Educational Justice, Fair Competition, and Dignity
The democratic adequacy view makes clear that securing fair or equal opportunities in the 
competition for social rewards is not the only thing that matters with respect to educational 
justice. The primary aim of education policy should be, according to Anderson and Satz, to 
enable each child to become a full-fledged member of the democratic community.  They 
justify this aim by referring to the ideal of egalitarian relationships:  Social  relationships 
should  be  organized in  a  way that  allows everyone  to  live  her  life  in  self-respect  and 
dignity.  It  is  exactly  this  core  idea  of  the  democratic  equality  account,  however,  that 
provides the link to the problem of fair competition.
The problem is this: It is usually agreed that, in the democratic market society, social  
positions—especially positions of advantage—should be allocated to the candidates best-
qualified  for  them,  independent  of  their  sex,  skin  color,  religion  or  sexual  orientation. 
Qualifications for social positions, however, are heavily [51] influenced by education. If, for 
instance, some social groups are excluded from the education needed to qualify for elite 
positions, we will not consider the competition for these positions to be fair. 
Hence,  what  we  need  is  a  normative  principle  that  specifies  which  educational 
inequalities can be seen as legitimate with regard to the aim of securing fair competition. In 
25 Satz,  ““Equality,  Adequacy,  and  Education  for  Citizenship,”  632;  Anderson,  “Fair  Opportunity  in 
Education,” 615.
26 Anderson, “Fair Opportunity in Education,” 618.
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the first part of this essay, I considered Brighouse and Swift’s meritocratic principle in this 
light. I argued that it is not clear why inequalities of motivation and natural endowment 
should be seen as morally  acceptable,  while a complete neutralization of  inequalities of 
ability  due  to  family  background  is  required.  Neither  a  merit-based nor  a  desert-based 
justification  can  adequately  ground this  differentiation  between  morally  legitimate  and 
illegitimate educational inequalities.
A third way to justify the meritocratic principle of educational justice would refer to  
efficiency considerations. However, if is not clear that fostering meritocracy is the best way 
to maximize overall utility or to improve the situation of the worst off. Brighouse and Swift, 
as  we  have  seen,  do  not propose  an  efficiency-based  justification  of  the  meritocratic 
principle. In their current papers, they give no justification at all. Efficiency considerations 
come  into  play,  within  their  account,  though,  since  they  subordinate the  meritocratic 
principle  to  a  principle  that  requires  to  give  priority  to  the  interests  of  the  worst  off. 
According to this latter principle, educational inequalities are justified if they bring about 
positive effects for the disadvantaged. If this principle trumps the meritocratic principle, 
this means that the meritocratic idea should only be realized to the extent that it does not 
conflict with the requirement of benefiting the worst off. Thus, according to Brighouse and 
Swift,  the  meritocratic  principle  of  fair  competition  has  to  be  violated  whenever  it  is  
assumed that this would have positive effects for the worst off. 
This consequence could be avoided by changing the order of the two principles. If the 
principle of benefiting the worst off is only used, as Brighouse and Swift explicitly state, to 
complete the meritocratic principle,  it is not clear why this latter principle should not be 
considered as the primary concern of educational justice. Brighouse and Swift, however,  
insist that benefiting the worst of is “the most urgent consideration“ of educational justice. 
According to Anderson and Satz,  it  is  the most urgent  consideration of  justice to create 
egalitarian relationships among the members of the democratic  community.  Within this 
basic framework, however, concern for the worst off is seen as an important requirement.  
Anderson claims that excluding members of disadvantaged groups from the competition 
for elite positions will  have negative public effects.  Thus,  her account might be read as 
providing some version of  the  efficiency-based justification  for  fair  competition.  At  the 
same time,  Anderson’s  and Satz’  democratic  ideal  of  egalitarian  relationships,  which is 
spelled out with reference to a broadly Kantian notion of dignity, is apt to ground a dignity-
based justification of fair competition. 
[52] Let  us  briefly  consider  some of  the  basic  aspects  of  the  normative  idea of  human 
dignity: Dignity-based considerations differ from efficiency- or utility-based views in that 
they protect a person’s rights or interests even if this is assumed to decrease overall utility 
or the utility for the worst off.
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They differ from merit- and desert-based considerations in that they refer to persons as  
persons, in other words, as rational and free beings—that is, they do not refer to individual  
qualities or actions that might give rise for special rewards.
This  implies  that  there  are,  among  persons,  no  differences  of  dignity.  The  moral 
community is  not  hierarchically structured.   Hence,  the concept of  dignity is  intimately 
connected to the idea of moral and political equality. Anderson emphasizes the distinction 
between this kind of equality on the on hand and distributive equality on the other hand. To 
recognize all persons as equals does not imply, that goods (or opportunities)  should be 
distributed equally. 
Anderson gives the concept of dignity a specifically social meaning: To be respected in 
one’s dignity thus means to be recognized as an equal in social relationships,  as a full-
fledged member of the democratic community. 
Establishing and maintaining egalitarian relationships, requires preparing everyone for full 
participation in the social, political and economic life of the democratic society. A basic level 
of education must therefore be provided for all, but this is not enough, since inequalities 
above this basic level are likely to influence the opportunities of individuals in the social 
competition. 
As was said above,  any inequality of educational achievement—whatever its source— 
can amount to a positional disadvantage for the less well off.  The meritocratic principle 
proposed by Brighouse and Swift establishes a precise differentiation between legitimate 
and  illegitimate  educational  inequalities,  but  lacks  an  adequate  justification  of  this 
differentiation. The dignity view, on the other hand, provides a clear-cut reason for the 
illegitimacy  of  certain  educational  inequalities  and,  moreover,  for  the  priority  of  fair 
competition over the requirement to benefit the worst off.27 According to the dignity view, 
as  I  understand  it,  conditions  of  social  competition  that  violate  the  dignity  of  some 
individuals are illegitimate, even if they bring about positive effects for the worst off in 
society.
On the other hand, it might be considered as a shortcoming of the dignity view that it 
does not offer a precise answer to the question which educational inequalities have to be 
seen  as  morally  unacceptable.  Satz  says,  rather  vaguely,  that  only  large educational 
27 It should be mentioned that the question of the order of these principles is not easy to handle. Rawls  
faced  a  similar  problem in  A Theory  of  Justice,  where  he  argued  for  the  priority  of  fair  equality  of 
opportunity over the difference principle. Equality of opportunity is more important, according to Rawls, 
because excluding some people from access to positions of advantage debarres them “from experiencing 
the realization of self which comes from a skillful and devoted exercise of social duties. They would be  
deprived  of  one  of  the  main  forms  of  human  good“  (A Theory  of  Justice,  73;  see  also  Taylor,  “Self 
Realization and the Priority of Fair Equality of Opportunity“). 
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inequalities relegate the disadvantaged to an inferior status.28 [53] Kenneth Strike, on the 
contrary,  insists  that  small educational inequalities also amount to an affront to human 
dignity, especially if they are systemic.29 Strike thus accepts, at least in the passages referred 
to,  the  dignity-based  justification  for  fair  competition,  but  the  practical  conclusions  he 
draws from it differ from those drawn by Anderson and Satz. Strike’s comments, however, 
are imprecise in an important respect: he says that “differences in access to prized social 
positions  are  all  offensive  to  human  dignity  when  they  are  systemic”30 without 
differentiating between various sources of inequality.  It  seems implausible,  for instance, 
that any inequality caused by natural endowment or the social and cultural practices within 
the family should be seen as a threat to human dignity. On the other hand, inequalities of 
schooling, even small ones, might in fact amount to an affront to individual dignity because 
they are likely to exacerbate the inequalities of ability and motivation that are caused by 
differences of family culture.31 The very same parents who read bedtime stories to their 
children also tend to have the opportunity (and the desire) to provide the best possible 
schooling for their children. Hence, to allow significant inequalities of schooling tends to 
exclude children from socially and economically disadvantaged families from access to elite 
positions. Therefore, inequalities of schooling threaten the dignity of the disadvantaged. It 
should be mentioned, however, that it is ultimately a question of empirical analysis whether 
some  educational  inequality  has  the  effect  of  excluding  certain  groups  from  access  to 
positions of advantage. This is a question that cannot be settled without taking into account 
the specific conditions in different school systems and the societies of which they are part.
Conclusions
This paper focuses on the main objection that can be put forward, from an egalitarian point 
of  view,  against  the  so-called  adequacy  view  of  educational  justice.  According  to  this 
objection,  the adequacy view neglects  the problem of  securing fair  opportunities  in the 
competition for social rewards. 
28 Satz, “Equality, Adequacy, and Education for Citizenship”, 637; “Equality, Adequacy, and Educational 
Policy,” 434.
29 See Strike, “Equality of Opportunity and School Finance,“ 486.
30 Strike, “Equality of Opportunity and School Finance,” 486.
31 According to Koski and Reich, it is morally unacceptable if state institutions are used “to compound or 
extend positional advantages of the already privileged and advantaged for reasons having nothing to do 
with whether  the already  privileged and advantaged merit  this  additional  positional  benefit” (“The 
State’s Obligation to Provide Education,” 34). Note, that these authors do not rely on a dignity-based, but 
on a merit-based account, in this context.
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I have tried to show that the egalitarian approach to this problem, as it is developed by 
Brighouse  and  Swift,  is  not  convincing.  First,  the  meritocratic  differentiation  between 
acceptable and unacceptable inequalities in education is not well founded. Second, their 
decision to subordinate the meritocratic principle to a principle that requires to benefit the 
worst off, calls into question their commitment to the idea of fair competition.
In addition,  it  was  argued that  the  democratic  adequacy view provides  a  promising 
approach to the problem of fair competition. The dignity view, I contend, is preferable to 
merit-, desert- or efficiency-based considerations. However, [54] the practical consequences 
of the dignity view are a matter of further debate.  Anderson and Satz use this view to 
justify  considerable  inequalities  in  education.  In  fact,  legitimatizing  private  educational 
investments is one of their main aims.
Brighouse and Swift, in contrast, are strongly convinced that inequalities in educational 
resources are unjust. This is the main point of dissent in the current debate, at least in terms 
of  practical  outcomes.  It  is  important  to  see  that  this  dissent  is  not  due  to  different 
normative principles, but to diverging empirical assumptions: Brighouse and Swift assume, 
contrary to their opponents, that private investments are unlikely to work for the benefit of 
the worst off. If concern for the worst off is accepted as the primary principle of educational 
justice, the legitimacy of private investments fully depends of empirical considerations of 
this kind. As I read Brighouse and Swift’s account, their meritocratic principle sets no limits 
on these efficiency-based considerations.
Contrary to that, the democratic adequacy account provides the theoretical resources to 
subordinate  the  idea  of  benefiting  the  worst  off  to  other  normative  considerations, 
especially the idea that fair conditions of competition should be guaranteed. Anderson and 
Satz, however, seem to think it unnecessary to fix a clear order of the different normative 
ideas.  In  their  view,  the  dignity  view of  fair  competition  will  neither  conflict  with the 
parental  liberty  principle  nor the  requirement  to  serve  the  interests  of  the  worst  off  in 
society.
There are good reasons, however, to assume that the dignity view demands to establish 
at least rough equality of schooling, e.g. of educational resources and quality. It can be seen as 
a threat to human dignity if  those already disadvantaged by their family culture suffer 
further  disadvantages  within  the  school  system and are  thereby in  fact  excluded from 
access to social positions of advantage. According to this line of thought, the dignity view is  
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